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Abstract
We assess a 2-period, non-cooperative equilibrium of an n country policy game
where countries chose either (i) carbon taxes, (ii) cap-and-trade policy with lo-
cal permit markets or (iii) cap-and-trade policy with internationally linked permit
markets and potential central redistribution of permit revenues. Policy makers
maximizes welfare, which depends on household consumption over time and envi-
ronmental damage from period-1 resource use. We assume costless and complete
extraction of this non-renewable resource, so damage only depends on speed of
extraction. Tax policy is the least efficient option due to carbon leakage, which
introduces a second externality adding to the environmental externality. Cap-and-
trade policy does not show any leakage since all symmetric countries will employ
caps. Its equilibrium thus only suffers from the environmental externality and wel-
fare is higher than under carbon taxation. The policy scenario with linked permit
markets and central redistribution yields an efficient outcome. The redistribution
of revenues creates a negative externality which offsets the positive environmental
externality.
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1 Introduction
Oil, natural gas, coal – in short fossil fuels – have been a main pillar of economic growth
and prosperity – at least since the industrial revolution. Although scientific research has
found much evidence for harmful anthropogenic climate change, caused by the intensive
use of fossil fuels,1 there are indications that fossil fuels will remain a major source of
energy in the world economy. According to the International Energy Agency, the era
of oil is not yet over. They forecast that global oil demand will increase until 2040.2
Others claim that at least conventional fossil fuel sources might be fully exploited over
the next decades due to the slow transition towards renewable sources of energy (Shafiee
and Topal, 2009; Fouquet, 2010; Ho¨o¨k and Tang, 2013).
The adverse effects of greenhouse gas emissions on the other hand require policy action.
The literature finds that the socially optimal extraction path of non-renewable resources
is slower than the laissez-faire extraction path, if extraction (or resource use) produces
negative externalities. This holds if damages depend on the stock of accumulated emis-
sions, see Withagen (1994) and Golosov et al. (2014) and others, or if damages depend
mainly on the change of the emission stock, i. e. the pace of greenhouse gas accumu-
lation and therefore climate change (Tahvonen, 1995; Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996). To
incentivize a postponement of supply, in general, it is optimal to implement a carbon
pricing policy, where present value carbon fees are non-increasing over time. However,
if no first-best policy is implemented, which is most likely the case in the real world,
extraction will be too fast, resulting in inefficiently high damage from climate change.
In applied politics, there is in deed evidence for rising “climate action” in various
countries in the past decades (Iacobuta et al., 2018). Yet apart from the question whether
such initiatives where sufficiently ambitious, a clear shortcoming of climate policy was and
still is that it has been implemented at regional levels at best, such as the EU Emission
Trading System (EU ETS), but mostly at national or even subnational levels due to a lack
in international cooperation.3 Climate change mitigation in one country or region causes
positive interregional externalities elsewhere by reducing climate damages. Not taking
into account these benefits of reduced damage outside its own territory, a policy maker will
implement an inefficiently low level of mitigation. The presence of such spillovers leads to
possibly insufficient participation and ineffective international environmental agreements
and therefore inefficiently high environmental damage, see Barrett (1994) and others.
Another spillover comes into play when considering international mobility on factor
and goods markets. Carbon leakage, the offset of emission abatement in one country
1See IPCC (2013)
2IEA 2018: World Energy Outlook 2017, https://www.iea.org/weo2017/#section-3-1
3The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) gives testimony where
a shift in global climate governance from aiming at “globally agreed” emission reduction targets
(UNFCCC Conference of the Parties Copenhagen 2009) to “nationally determined” reduction targets
(2015 Paris Accord) could be observed (Cramton et al., 2017; Iacobuta et al., 2018).
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through the rise in emissions elsewhere, reduces the effectiveness of mitigation policies.
In their review, Chen and Woodland (2013) conclude that the theoretical literature is
quite inconclusive as to whether leakage is positive, negative or even insignificant, while
assessments based on computable general equilibrium models in general indicate positive
leakage rates. The leakage intensity depends on the structural factors of the implementing
economy as well as the type of policy that is implemented. In that respect, Krishna
(2011) points out that in the case of large open economies, which have an impact on
global factor prices, a higher carbon tax or tighter cap will lead to carbon leakage unless
there are quantitative carbon controls in the rest of the world, i. e. cap-and-trade policy.
So, in a world with complete international application of (binding) caps, there will be
no leakage, as opposed to a world where all countries employ carbon taxes (or other
non-quantity-based instruments like green energy subsidies). On the other hand, price
based carbon policies (like taxes) do not exhibit a lower bound issue, i. e. there could be
a carbon subsidy, while permit prices in emission trading systems cannot fall below zero.
Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) show that in special cases the optimal carbon tax trajectory
could consist of negative taxes in some point of time yet not throughout. In practice,
both types of instruments have been implemented in a number of countries. Since the
1990s carbon taxes have been introduced in 17 countries and emission trading schemes
(ETS’s) in 55 countries (Haites, 2018).4
These observations lead to our research question: Is extraction slowed down more effec-
tively in a world with carbon taxes or in a world with cap-and-trade policies considering
international trade on factor and goods markets and non-cooperative policy makers. In
order to address our research question, we employ a 2-period model of n identical jurisdic-
tions. A homogeneous non-renewable natural resource (henceforth resource) is exploited
costlessly over time and traded globally. Each jurisdiction’s local firm produces the ho-
mogeneous consumption good, while the resource serves as the only production factor.
These firms are subject to local climate policy, i. e. a carbon tax or an emission cap, which
is set by local governments. Private households obtain utility from consumption in both
periods and undertake consumption smoothing. Local governments in turn maximize
local welfare, here the balance of lifetime consumption utility and local environmental
damage, by applying one of the discussed policy instruments. The policy makers take
each other’s strategies as given (Nash conjecture), but take the private actors’ reactions
to policy parameters into account. In our model, environmental damage depends on the
steepness of the extraction path, as the resource is always fully depleted. We consider
general equilibrium aspects by endogenously determining market prices including the dis-
count rate and recycling profits from local firms and resource rents as household income.
Furthermore, the resource extractor considers the households’ intertemporal rate of sub-
stitution as its discount rate to maximize its shareholder value. We study both policy
4In all cases these schemes do cover only some economic sectors. Moreover, many countries employ
both types of policies side by side to achieve greater coverage of greenhouse gas emissions.
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instruments in separate scenarios, meaning that we assume that all countries employ
either carbon taxes or cap-and-trade schemes.
We obtain the following results. Firstly, with respect to carbon taxation we find that
unilaterally raising the tax rate in the first (second) period slows down (accelerates)
extraction. The reason is as follows. Within the same period, the tax distorts the factor
market, putting downward pressure on the factor price. Due to the Hotelling rule, the
resource extractor is encouraged to flatten (incline) the extraction path. On the other
hand, with postponement (front-loading) of extraction, total production of consumption
goods is shifted to the future (present). Again, via the Hotelling rule, the resulting
adjustment of the household discount rate attenuates the change in extraction speed.
In line with the literature, the equilibrium carbon tax schedule is less steep than the
fossil fuel price path, in our case we have a first-period tax and a second-period subsidy.5
Leakage comes into play since resource demand partially relocates to other jurisdictions
within the period in which the tax change occurs. This in turn lowers the effectiveness of
the instrument to alter the extraction path and thus its impact on environmental damage.
Secondly, for the cap-and-trade policy we find that jurisdictions set binding caps only
in period 1, while they abstain from doing so in period 2. The rationale behind this
is that environmental damage in our model only depends on first-period extraction; so
there is no use in limiting emissions in the second period. When countries choose identical
policies, a cap reduction by one country in period 1 directly translates into postponement
of extraction, as fossil fuel consumption in other countries is constrained by the local cap.
Consequently, there is no leakage.
Thirdly, comparing the policy equilibria of both scenarios, we find that welfare is
higher under the cap-and-trade policy than under carbon tax policy. We can show that
environmental damage in the former case is closer to the first-best policy choice. This
stems from the effectiveness of limiting emissions with the help of caps, which can be
explained by the absence of carbon leakage when using this instrument.
There have been numerous contributions comparing quantity and price based policy
instruments, following the seminal contribution of Weitzman (1974). An overview is found
in Cropper and Oates (1992) and more recently in Goulder and Schein (2013). Under
certain circumstances, determining either the quantity or the price of carbon might be
advantageous, e. g. uncertain abatement cost or climate damages, carbon price volatility,
openness of the economy and concerns about competitiveness as well as strategic reactions
by the supply side of fossils and possible wealth transfers.
Regarding our research question, the literature focusing on strategic interaction in
climate policy highlights that due to carbon leakage equilibria where all jurisdictions
employ carbon taxes yield lower welfare than equilibria with ETS’s. Hoel (2005) as well
as Sim and Lin (2018) show this when countries have multiple industries of different
pollution intensities, while Kiyono and Ishikawa (2013) and Eichner and Pethig (2015)
5See e. g. Sinclair (1994).
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assume that there are clean goods as an (imperfect) substitute for dirty goods. All of
these contributions assume trade in fossil fuel or final goods, provoking changes of relative
prices or resource prices, which in turn cause the leakage effect when carbon taxes are
employed. Tsakiris et al. (2017) show that the leakage effect prevails also if emissions are
modeled as a by-product and the traded production factor is capital.
Our contribution is to analyze the aforementioned questions in a general equilibrium,
n country, two-period model. Considering a dynamic perspective is essential as regards
climate policy, from our point of view. And accounting for economy-wide impact of ac-
tivities based on fossil fuel use, the same reasoning applies to general equilibrium effects.
Most importantly, the fossil fuel supply (path) as well as the discount rate of the re-
source extracting firm are determined endogenously. Applying general functional forms
makes our results more robust against specific assumption, but limits the analysis to the
symmetric case.
As an extension, we assess a proposal of intermediate cooperation for a world with cap-
and-trade policy, which consists in linking national permit markets. This is motivated
firstly by the literature on the international linking of permit markets. For an overview,
see Flachsland et al. (2009). Most of those analyses are dedicated to identify benefits
and drawbacks in the context of heterogeneous countries or market structures, where the
main argument is to increase cost-effectiveness by equalization of marginal abatement
costs across countries. Carbone et al. (2009) find potentially significant reductions of
global emissions by enacting a linking agreement. Secondly, in the real world, a number
of linking initiatives could be observed recently. Just take the cases of California and
Quebec in 2014, and the EU and Switzerland in 2016, where emission trading schemes
have been joined, see Narassimhan et al. (2018).
We show how moderate coordination or centralization may help to achieve higher wel-
fare. We find that if countries agree to link their permit markets and to create a revenue
distribution scheme where all permits are auctioned off and revenues are distributed by
evenly, they can achieve the first-best allocation. The technical rationale behind this
result is that through the redistribution scheme countries can impose a negative pol-
icy externality on other countries. When tightening the local permit supply, the loss of
revenues is distributed to all countries. This way each country’s policy maker has the
incentive to tighten its permit supply below the non-cooperative equilibrium level in the
local permit markets scenario.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model extensively and derives
the policy equilibrium for the carbon taxation scenario. Section 3 describes the model
economy in a world with cap-and-trade policy and derives the policy equilibrium for
local permit markets, while Section 4 does so for the case of linked permit markets.
Section 5 presents the welfare analysis and establishes the main results of the paper.
Finally Section 6 concludes.
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2 A World with Carbon Taxation Policy
2.1 Market Equilibrium
Consider a model economy with n ≥ 2 identical countries and two periods, the present
(t = 1) and the future (t = 2) and suppose there is a representative local firm in each
country. This firm produces a consumption good using a natural resource. The universal
production technology is depicted by a concave production function F (eit), where eit
represents resource input in country i ∈ {1, . . . , n} at time t and which satisfies F ′ > 0,
F ′′ < 0, and limeit→0 F
′ = ∞. These assumptions imply decreasing returns to scale of
F (eit) in eit, which we motivate by assuming that production also relies on the invariant
input of an immobile, local production factor such as land – suppressed for notational
convenience.
In each period t, the firm purchases the resource on the world market at price pt and
sells its output at a price normalized to unity. Next to that, the firm also pays a local tax
rate τit per unit of resource employed in production. The firm, which maximizes profits
by the choice resource input, thus solves the problem given by
max
eit
πit = F (eit)− [pt + τit] eit. (1)
Its optimal choice must satisfy
F ′(eit) = pt + τit, (2)
which is the first-order condition of (1). Thus, the firm chooses eit such that marginal
productivity of the resource F ′ equals the gross factor cost pt + τit per unit of input.
Due to decreasing returns to scale, firm profits are positive in the optimum. This can
be seen by inserting (2) into (1), which yields πit > 0 since the concavity of F (·) implies
F (eit)− eitF ′(eit) > 0.
The resource used in production is supplied by a representative global extraction firm.
This firm exploits the world’s non-renewable resource stock e¯ over the course of the two
periods. For the sake of tractability, we abstract from stock dependent extraction costs
and assume that fixed costs of this firm are negligible. We assume, the firm maximizes
net present value of periodical profits by determining the supply in each period (est), given
the resource constraint set by e¯, the resource prices p1 and p2, and the discount rate r.
Its optimization problem is formally given by
max
es1,e
s
2
πR = πR1 +
πR2
1 + r
= p1e
s
1 +
p2e
s
2
1 + r
, (3)
s. t. e¯ = es1 + e
s
2. (4)
The resulting first-order condition, given by
[1 + r]p1 = p2, (5)
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is obtained by using (4) in (3) to substitute for es2 and subsequently deriving with respect
to es1, which gives the marginal net present value of profit. The latter is independent
of the choice of es1 (and e
s
2) and equates to zero, if market prices satisfy (5), which
represents a simple version of the Hotelling rule. Thus, if discounted resource prices of
different periods are identical, as stated by (5), the resource extracting firm is indifferent
regarding the supply quantity in each period.
Finally, the representative private household in each country is the third type of pri-
vate agent in the model. It obtains utility from consuming in each period and therefore
spends her income on the (consumption) good produced by the local firms. The house-
hold’s preferences are represented by a homothetic lifetime utility function U(ci1, ci2)
where cit denotes consumption in country i in period t. We assume that ci1 are normal
goods.
The income of household in period t comprises profit transfers by the local firm πit
and a share of 1
n
of the global resource rent (
πRt
n
). Moreover, we assume, the household
smooths out consumption over time by borrowing debt (providing credit) in period 1,
denoted by bi (a creditor’s bi would be negative), and repaying (receiving) it in period 2.
Finally, tax income in period t, given by Tit = τiteit, is recycled as a lump sum transfer
to the household. Formally, the household’s optimization problem is given by
max
ci1,ci2,bi
u = U(ci1, ci2) (6)
s.t. ci1 = πi1 +
πR1
n
+ Ti1 + bi, (7)
ci2 = πi2 +
πR2
n
+ Ti2 − bi[1 + r]. (8)
According to (6) - (8) the household in country i maximizes its life-time utility subject
to the budget constraints over the two periods. Using (7) and (8) in (6), the problem is
reduced to the choice of debt bi. We obtain the first-order condition given by
U1
U2
= 1 + r, (9)
where U1 and U2 denote marginal utility of consumption in period 1 and 2 respectively. It
states, the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, given by the left-hand side of (9),
should equal the relative price of consumption today vs. consumption tomorrow. Thus,
the household will choose bi so as to adjust its path of consumption in a way that the
cost of increasing consumption today, given by the interest rate, just matches the ratio
of additional utility today and loss of utility tomorrow.
The description of the private part of the model is completed by the clearing conditions
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for the consumption good, the resource, and the savings market, i. e.
n∑
k=1
ckt =
n∑
k=1
F (ekt), t = 1, 2 (10)
n∑
k=1
ekt = e
s
t , t = 1, 2 (11)
n∑
k=1
bk = 0. (12)
These equations state that demand must equal supply on the respective market.6
One important aspect mentioned in the introduction was the harmful effect of green-
house gas emissions on welfare via climate change. We incorporate this into the model
by assuming that the use of the resource in production causes environmental damage.
Thereby we assume that periodical damages depend on the accumulated stock of emis-
sions in the atmosphere, i. e. damage per period, denoted by dt for t = 1, 2, is given
by d1 = D(e
s
1) and d2 = D(e
s
1 + e
s
2) with D
′ > 0 and D′′ > 0, where global resource
demand is substituted by using (11). Since we also assume that the polluting resource is
fully depleted at the end of period 2, life-time damage for the household is simply given
by D(es1). This admittedly very simple form of accounting for climate damage helps us
to focus on damage from the speed of extraction. For simplicity, welfare in country i is
assumed to be additively separable in utility and damage, and is formally given by
Wi = U(ci1, ci2)−D(es1). (13)
For later purposes, we derive the impact of the policy parameters τi1 and τi2 on the market
equilibrium. The latter is described by the private actors’ first-order conditions, given
by (2), (5) and (9), the resource constraint (4) and the household budgets (7) and (8) as
well as the market clearing conditions (11) and (12). Henceforth, we focus on symmetry
assuming that countries choose symmetric tax rates τit = τt. Then, from (2) it follows
that F ′(eit) = F ′t and eit = et. And due to (7) - (9) as well as (12) we obtain bi = b = 0,
cit = ct and Ut(cci1, ci2) = Ut. We find the following comparative static effects of changing
today’s or tomorrow’s carbon tax rate in country i:
∂r
∂τi1
> 0,
∂p1
∂τi1
< 0,
∂p2
∂τi1
< 0, (14a)
∂ei1
∂τi1
< 0,
∂ei2
∂τi1
> 0,
∂ej1
∂τi1
> 0,
∂ei2
∂τi1
=
∂ej2
∂τi1
> 0,
∂es1
∂τi1
< 0, (14b)
∂r
∂τi2
< 0,
∂p1
∂τi2
< 0,
∂p2
∂τi2
< 0, (14c)
∂ei1
∂τi2
=
∂ej1
∂τi2
> 0,
∂ei2
∂τi2
< 0,
∂ej1
∂τi2
> 0,
∂ej2
∂τi2
> 0,
∂es1
∂τi2
> 0. (14d)
6Equation (10) is stated merely for the sake of completeness. Due to Walras’ law, we can ignore it and
normalize the price of the consumption good to unity (see Eichner and Pethig, 2013).
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For the derivation see Appendix A. The effects stated in (14a) - (14d) can be explained
as follows: Raising the present tax rate, τi1, increases the gross factor cost per unit in
country i, p1 + τi1, suppressing demand for the natural resource by the local firm, ei1.
The resulting excess supply puts downward pressure on p1, which in turn has two effects.
It induces demand in other jurisdictions, ej1, to increase, since the gross factor cost there
falls and at the same time supply, es1, is shifted to the second period due to the Hotelling
rule, given by (5). The latter reaction lets p2 fall, since accommodating additional supply
leads to falling marginal productivity in period 2. Finally, the shift of resource supply
from period 1 to period 2 leads to less production in period 1 and according to (9) to
a rising marginal intertemporal rate of substitution and thus a rising interest rate, r.
Raising the future tax rate, τi2, works into the opposite direction since the distortion of
the factor market takes place in period 2.
2.2 Policy Choice
We consider a one-shot Nash game among policy makers, who choose local carbon tax
rates for both periods to maximize welfare of the domestic household (13). The optimiza-
tion problem for the policy maker in country i, who is considering the household’s budget
constraints (7) and (8) as well as the comparative static effects (14a) - (14d), formally
reads
max
τi1,τi2
Wi = U
(
ci1 (τi1, τi2) , ci2 (τi1, τi2)
)−D (es1 (τi1, τi2)) , (15)
where we denote the market equilibrium variables as functions of the tax rates in country
i and suppress the tax rates of other countries due to the Nash conjecture. We limit our
analysis to a symmetric equilibrium policy choice, as outlined above. In order to obtain
the optimal carbon tax strategy in country i, we take the first-order conditions of (15),
which read ∂Wi
∂τit
= 0 for t = 1, 2, use the differentiated household budget constraints, see
(76) and (77) in Appendix A (divided by dτit), and simplify with the help of the resource
extractor’s and the households’ first-order conditions, given by (5) and (9), which gives
∂Wi
∂τit
= U1
∂ci1
∂τit
+ U2
∂ci2
∂τit
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂τit
= 0
⇔ ∂Wi
∂τit
= U1τ1
∂ei1
∂τit
+ U2τ2
∂ei2
∂τit
−D′ ∂es1
∂τit
= 0, t = 1, 2. (16)
Then we solve system of two equations given in (16) for τ1 and τ2 and obtain
Proposition 1. The symmetric equilibrium tax rates of the Nash policy game are given
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by
τ ∗1 =
D′
U1
∂es1
∂τi1
∂ei2
∂τi2
− ∂es1
∂τi2
∂ei2
∂τi1
∂ei1
∂τi1
∂ei2
∂τi2
− ∂ei2
∂τi1
∂ei1
∂τi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈]0,1[
> 0, (17)
τ ∗2 =
D′
U2
∂es1
∂τi2
∂ei1
∂τi1
− ∂es1
∂τi1
∂ei1
∂τi2
∂ei1
∂τi1
∂ei2
∂τi2
− ∂ei2
∂τi1
∂ei1
∂τi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈]−1,0[
< 0. (18)
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The equilibrium taxation strategy, presented in Proposition 1, consists of a positive
tax rate in period 1 and a negative tax rate (hence a subsidy) in period 2. The rationale
behind this result is to be found in the comparative static effects shown above. By raising
the first-period carbon tax, country i is slowing down the emission path
(
∂es1
∂τi1
< 0
)
and
therefore reduces environmental damage. On the contrary, the second-period carbon tax
has to be lowered to yield an effect in this direction
(
∂es1
∂τi2
> 0
)
. The reason for using the
carbon tax in both periods instead of one is that τi1 as well as τi2 distort private decisions
and that these distortions grow overproportionately with the absolute value of the tax
rate. Hence, using both instruments moderately instead of heavily using a carbon tax in
only one period reduces the overall distortion.
To explain our findings in more detail, the expressions determining the equilibrium
carbon tax rates (17) and (18) may be divided into two terms. The marginal damage to
utility ratios, D
′
U1
and D
′
U2
respectively, highlight the trade-off between the (direct) cost and
benefits of the policy, given by the intertemporal shift in consumption and the reduction
of environmental damage.
The remaining terms in (17) and (18) represent the effectiveness of the tax rates τi1
and τi2 respectively by relating the change of the tax base, i. e. resource consumption
today or in the future, to the speed of extraction. In Appendix A we show that both
ratios are less than one in absolute terms. This is driven by the interregional relocation
of resource demand (inter-regional leakage), see equations (96) and (97) in Appendix A,
which is indicated by
∂ej1
∂τi1
> 0 and
∂ej2
∂τi2
> 0 respectively.
Proposition 1 is in line with the literature on optimal carbon taxation, which finds that
emission taxation trajectories should flatten the time path of the resource price for the
demand side in order to incentivize a shift of fossil fuel demand, and consequently supply,
to the future.7 In the present model, the price path of the resource is increasing at a rate
of 1 + r due to the Hotelling rule in the absence of policy. However, with equilibrium
carbon tax rates the price path for resource users becomes pt + τt, which rises at a rate
less than 1 + r since τ ∗1 > 0 and τ
∗
2 < 0 according Proposition 1.
7See e. g. Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Sinclair (1992), Sinclair (1994), or Sinn (2008).
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3 A World with Cap-and-Trade Policy and Local Permit
Markets
3.1 Market Equilibrium
We now turn to the assessment of cap-and-trade policies, for which we adapt the model
presented above. The volume of emission permits in country i and period t is denoted
by eˆit and we assume that all permits are handed out freely to the local firm.
8 Formally,
the local firm’s maximization problems reads
max
eit
πit = F (eit)− [p1 + φit] eit + φiteˆit, (19)
s.t. eit ≤ eˆit,
where φit denotes the permit price in country i and period t. The firm’s total earnings thus
consist of profits from production as well as of pollution permit sales. Its optimization
problem is constrained by the emission cap, since in each country there is only one
representative firm. Given the assumptions regarding F (·) stated in the previous section,
the profit-maximizing firm fully exploits the cap eit = eˆit. So, the first-order condition to
the problem given by (19) reads
F ′(eit) = pt + φit. (20)
The extraction firm’s objective function (3), the resource constraint (4) and its first-
order condition (5) carry directly over from the carbon taxation scenario. However, the
household’s budget constraints are slightly different and read
ci1 = πi1 +
πR1
n
+ bi, (21)
ci2 = πi2 +
πR2
n
− bi[1 + r], (22)
with the major difference that there are no transfers of public revenue due to free permit
allocation, i.e. Ti1 = Ti2 = 0. Firm profits πit are given by (19) and the revenue of
the resource extractor πRt is given, as before, by (3). The maximization problem of the
household (6) applies here, but is subject to (21) and (22). Since the household perceives
income as given, the resulting first-order condition (9) also carries over. And so do the
market clearing conditions (10) - (12).
Before we proceed to the derivation of the policy choice, we motivate that policy makers
have an interest to set caps in the first, but not in the second period. The reason behind
8In the present model, free allocation of permits to firms is equivalent to auctioning and redistributing
the permit sales to the household via a lump-sum transfer. The reason is that the household is the
sole owner of the local production firm and receives all local permit sales through either scheme, while
the firm’s decision is not affected by free allocation or auctioning.
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this is that permit prices cannot fall below zero in contrast to taxes. Hence, a cap can
only be used to yield a reduction of resource use in a given period and country, while
taxes may function as an incentive to increase resource consumption in that period when
converted into subsidies, see Section 2. In the following, we assess the incentive of country
i to introduce a cap either in period 1 or 2 always taking as given that all other countries
implement caps only in period 1. So, for the time being, we formulate welfare as a
function of the caps in both periods
Wi = U
(
ci1 (eˆi1, eˆi2) , ci2 (eˆi1, eˆi2)
)−D (es1 (eˆi1, eˆi2)) , (23)
where we again suppress foreign caps due to the Nash conjecture.
3.2 Introduction of a Cap in Period 2
Suppose that country i imposes a cap in period 1 and introduces a cap in period 2, while
all other countries j = i implement caps only in period 1. Thus we have eit = eˆit for
t = 1, 2 and ej1 = eˆj1, while φj2 = 0 since countries j = i implement no cap in period 2.
The market equilibrium is described by (4), (5), (9), (12) and (20) for t = 1, as well as
F ′2(ei2) = p2 + φi2, (24)
F ′2(ej2) = p2, (25)
n∑
k=1
eˆk1 = e
s
1, (26)
n∑
j =i
ej2 + eˆi2 = e
s
2. (27)
In order to assess the marginal effect of eˆi2 on welfare in country i, we derive its com-
parative static effects of eˆi2 on the time path of extraction and domestic consumption
in each period. Therefore, we differentiate (26), where deˆi1 = deˆj1 = 0 due to the Nash
conjecture, and find
∂es1
∂eˆi2
= 0, (28)
and due to our assumption of inelastic total resource supply, see (4), we obtain also9
∂es2
∂eˆi2
= 0. (29)
These findings indicate that, given all countries employ binding caps in period 1, the
policy maker in country does not exert any effect on the time structure of resource supply.
9Equation (29) is obtained by totally differentiating (4) and using (28).
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The comparative static effects on consumption are obtained by differentiating the bud-
get constraints (21) and (22). There we get
∂ci1
∂eˆi2
=
∂bi
∂eˆi2
, (30)
∂ci2
∂eˆi2
= φi2 − [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi2
, (31)
see Appendix B. The net effect of eˆi2 on profit income and the lump sum transfer amounts
to φi2 in period 2, while period 1 all partial effects on profit income offset each other.
According to (31), lowering the number of permits reduce income by the value that these
permits have. This decrease in the transfer of permit revenues can be interpreted as a
loss in economic surplus, since the permit price is equal to the difference between the
marginal product of the resource in production and its factor price, see (24). Due a
change in income in period 2, the household may adjust demand for debt, which affects
consumption in both periods. However, introducing eˆi2 means that the comparative static
effects are evaluated at marginally binding cap level (φi2 = 0), so that the net effect on
income in period 2 disappears.
And when we finally look at welfare, deriving (23) with respect to eˆi2 and considering
(28), (30) and (31) we find that the marginal effect is zero
∂Wi
∂eˆi2
= 0, (32)
see Appendix B for the derivation. The rationale behind this result is twofold. Firstly,
the change in household debt has no effect on life-time utility due to an undistorted
inter-household capital market – ∂bi
∂eˆi2
cancels out. And secondly, environmental damage
does not change since the extraction in period 1 is not affected by the cap in period 2
according to (28).
3.3 Tightening the Cap in Period 1 Beyond the Marginally Binding
Level
Now suppose that all countries implement a marginally binding cap in period 1 and no
country imposes a cap in the second period, i. e. ek1 = eˆk1 and φk2 = φk2 = 0 for k = i, j.
The market equilibrium here is identical to the one described for the assessment of the
introduction of the second-period cap, only that we adapt (24) - (27) to account for the
complete absence of cap-and-trade policy period 2, which gives
n∑
k=1
eˆk1 = e
s
1, (33)
F ′2(ek2) = p2, for k = i, j, (34)
while market clearing condition for the resource in t = 2 is given by (11). The comparative
static effects of changing the cap in period 1 differ substantially from those induced by
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changing eˆi2. Differentiating (33) with respect to eˆi1 we obtain
∂es1
∂eˆi1
= 1, (35)
which we use together with the differentiated resource constraint (4) to receive
∂es2
∂eˆi1
= −1. (36)
Equations (35) and (36) state that tightening the cap of country i in period 1 shifts
resource supply in exact proportion from period 1 to period 2. Thus, the policy maker
can effectively induce a postponement of resource extraction by tightening eˆi1 beyond the
marginally binding level. Moreover, she is able to do so without causing carbon leakage
– in contrast to the setting with carbon taxes.
The effect of eˆi1 on consumption is also different from the case of introducing eˆi2. This
can be seen by differentiating (21) and (22), for which we obtain
∂ci1
∂eˆi1
= φi1 +
p1
n
+
∂bi
∂eˆi1
, (37)
∂ci2
∂eˆi1
= −p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi1
. (38)
See Appendix B for the derivation. The net effect on income induced by a reduction
in eˆi1 consists of lower permit revenues and lower resource rents in period 1, while the
latter increase in period 2, which can be seen in (37) and (38) by setting deˆi1 < 0. The
former effect is due to the reduction of permits itself, while the latter is owed to the shift
of resource supply from period 1 to period 2. These changes on income again motivate
changes in debt demand by the household. However, given that first-period caps are just
marginally binding, we have φi1 = 0 in (37).
When looking at the overall effect of eˆi1 on welfare in country i, we find that a tightening
beyond the marginally binding level increases welfare, i. e.
∂Wi
∂eˆi1
= −D′ < 0, (39)
which we obtain by differentiating (23) with respect to eˆi1 and considering (35), (37)
and (38). See again Appendix B for the derivation. Since reducing eˆi1 shifts extraction
to the future, environmental damage decreases and therefore welfare increases. At the
same time, the changes in consumption do not affect life-time utility again due to the
undistorted intertemporal market.10 From (32) and (39) we infer
Lemma 1. Given environmental damage is stock-depend and total extraction is exoge-
nously given, local policy makers implement cap-and-trade policy only in the first of two
periods.
10The changes in debt demand and the alteration of periodical extraction profits cancel out, since the
resource extractor’s discount rate, the marginal intertemporal rate of substitution by the household
and the interest rate at the capital market all coincide in the market equilibrium.
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3.4 Policy Choice
Based on Lemma 1, we consider a Nash game among policy makers who each maximize
welfare of their local household, given by (23), setting a cap on emissions in period 1
only. Accounting for the fact that the use of the cap is limited to period 1 in (23), the
maximization problem of the policy maker in country i reads
max
eˆi1
Wi = U
(
ci1 (eˆi1) , ci2 (eˆi1)
)−D (es1 (eˆi1)) . (40)
In solving (40), the policy maker considers the comparative static effects given by (35) -
(38), while φi1 ≥ 0, since the policy choice could be a strictly binding cap.11
The first-order condition of (40) is given by ∂Wi
∂eˆi1
= 0, which we simplify with the help
of (35), (37) and (38) and obtain12
∂Wi
∂eˆi1
= U1φi1 −D′ = 0. (41)
The net effects of the policy instrument on income as well as on debt demand, see (37) and
(38), offset each other over the two periods – except for the change in permit revenues.
Thinking in terms of tightening the cap (deˆi1 < 0), the decrease in permit revenues
represents the marginal cost of the policy (U1φi1). On the other hand, the marginal
benefit consists in the reduction of environmental damage by diminishing first-period
resource consumption, see (35). For the policy equilibrium, we again consider symmetry,
i. e. eˆ∗i1 = eˆ
∗
1 implying φ
∗
i1 = φ
∗
1.
Proposition 2. Suppose that policy makers only implement a cap policy in period 1 and
that permit markets are local. The symmetric Nash equilibrium exhibits a permit price
φ∗1 =
D′
U1
> 0, (42)
while, following Lemma 1, permit prices in period 2 are implicit and equal to zero
φ∗2 = 0. (43)
Proof. See Appendix B. 
According to Proposition 2, policy makers restrict the use of the polluting resource
in period 1 to an extent, where the marginal utility loss from the decreasing economic
surplus just equals the marginal benefit of reduced environmental damage.13
11The structure of the market equilibrium is identical to the one presented above, where we study the
effect of tightening a marginally binding cap in period 1.
12See Appendix B for the derivation.
13Slightly rearrange (42) to obtain U1φ
∗
1 = D
′.
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4 A World with Cap-and-Trade Policy and Linked Permit
Markets
Finally, we turn to the extension regarding the cap-and-trade scenario. Suppose countries
create a single market for emission permits with a global permit price ϕt, where the sum
of all permits, which we denote by eˇit, constitutes total supply. Formally, the single
permit market implies
∑n
k=1 ekt ≤
∑n
k=1 eˇkt. The decision on permit levels is assumed to
remain with the local policy makers, which is why we keep the country index for local
permit supplies eˇit. Additionally, we assume that a share α of locally determined permits
is auctioned by a central authority, which then redistributes total revenues evenly among
all countries. Local governments then pass on this payment to their domestic households.
Thus, in country i the household receives Tit =
α
n
ϕt
∑n
k=1 eˇkt, while the firm obtains
[1− α]ϕteˇit.
Therefore, we adapt the model with cap-and-trade policy presented in Section 3. For
the profit maximization problem of the firm in country i, given by (19), we have here
max
eit
πit = F (eit)− [pt + ϕt] eit + [1− α]ϕteˇit, (44)
from which we obtain the first-order condition, which reads
F ′(eit) = pt + ϕt. (45)
In contrast to the case of local permit markets, demand of the local production firm for
the resource ei1 is not constrained by the quantity of domestic permits eˇi1. However,
taking the characteristics of the production function (F ′t > 0, F
′′
t < 0, F
′
t (e = 0) → ∞)
we argue that the firms of all countries together fully exploit the sum of certificates in
each period, which gives
n∑
k=1
ekt =
n∑
k=1
eˇkt. (46)
Concerning the household budget constraints (21) and (22), firm profits πit are given
by (44) and we reintroduce government transfers Tit =
α
n
ϕt
∑n
k=1 eˇkt, while the profit of
the resource-extracting firm is unchanged and given by (3). As outlined in the previous
section, the household’s optimization problem, given by (6) together with the first-order
condition, given by (9), carries over from the other scenarios. Finally, the market clearing
conditions (11) and (12), as well as the resource constraint (4) apply here.
Now we turn to the policy makers. In Appendix C we show that these have an in-
centive to tighten their permit supply below the marginally binding level only in period
1. Therefore, we assume the cap-and-trade policy is implemented only in period 1 under
the linked-permit-market regime, just like in the local permit market regime. So, the
local firm’s optimization problem in period 2 carries over from Section 3.3 and in the
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household budget in period 2 exhibits Ti2 = 0. Thus, the market equilibrium is given by
(4), (5), (9), (12), as well as (45) and (46) for t = 1, or (11) and (34) for t = 2.
The comparative static effects of changing eˇi1 on the extraction path of the resource
as well as on household consumption are derived in Appendix C. For the effect on fossil
fuel supply in period 1 we find
∂es1
∂eˇi1
= 1, (47)
which resembles (35). The comparative static effect is the same, since in both cases, i. e.
local and linked permit markets, the sum of permit levels constrains global fossil fuel
supply in period 1 and a change of eˆi1 or eˇi1 defines the loosening or tightening of this
constraint. Also, the effects on consumption in both periods, given by
∂ci1
∂eˇi1
=
[
1− α + α
n
]
ϕ1 +
p1
n
+
∂bi
∂eˇi1
, (48)
∂ci2
∂eˇi1
= −p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˇi1
, (49)
are nearly identical with one exception. The effect on ci1 is different from the case of local
permit markets due to the redistribution mechanism, see the first term on the right hand
side of (48). If all permits are handed out freely to the firms, i. e. α = 0, then we are
back to the case of local markets. The reduction of permit revenues for the household in
country i amounts to the permit price ϕ1, i.e. the value of the marginal permits taken off
the market. However, if all permits are auctioned and centrally redistributed, i. e. α = 1,
a cap tightening in country i affects the household there through a marginal loss of only
1
n
ϕ1. This is so, because the total reduction of permit revenues, which follows from a
reduction of eˇi1, is shared out among the households of all n countries.
We now turn to the policy makers’ problem. In line with the scenarios presented above,
we assume, policy makers determine the amount of permits eˇi1 to maximize local welfare
in a Nash game, considering the comparative static effects (47), (48) and (49). Formally,
the policy problem reads
max
eˇi1
Wi = U
(
ci1 (eˇi1) , ci2 (eˇi1)
)−D (es1 (eˇi1)) , (50)
and the corresponding first-order condition, given by ∂Wi
∂eˇi1
= 0, simplifies to
∂Wi
∂eˇi1
=
[
1− α + α
n
]
U1ϕ1 −D′ = 0, (51)
where we used (47), (48) and (49). See Appendix C for the derivation. The optimal
policy choice following from (51) is presented in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that policy makers only implement cap-and-trade policy in period
1 and that permits are traded on a global market. The symmetric Nash equilibrium exhibits
a global permit price in period 1
ϕ∗1|α=0 =
D′
U1
> 0, (52)
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or
ϕ∗1|α=1 =
nD′
U1
> 0, (53)
depending on the value of α, while the global permit price in period 2 is implicit and equal
to zero
ϕ∗2|α∈[0,1] = 0. (54)
Proof. Statements (52) and (53) are obtained directly from (51). 
Comparing Propositions 2 and 3, we find that φ∗1 = ϕ
∗
1|α=0. Thus, without any central
auctioning the equilibrium permit prices are identical in the local-permit-market and the
global-permit-market scenarios. The rationale behind this finding is that marginal costs
of tightening the first-period caps are identical,14 since redistributed revenues Ti1 are
structurally the same in both scenarios. These depend on domestic permits only as well
as on the permit price, which is identical in both cases, given that eˇ1 = eˆ1. However,
the introduction of central redistribution to equal shares makes the difference. Domestic
permit revenue only makes up a share of 1
n
of Ti1. This in turn lowers the marginal cost
of tightening the domestic cap exactly by that fraction.
5 Welfare Analysis
Having derived the policy equilibria for the carbon taxation scenario as well as for the cap-
and-trade scenarios we proceed to the welfare analysis and the ranking of the policies. We
begin by deriving the first-best policy choice, which defines the benchmark for evaluating
the decentral policy equilibrium in each scenario. To this end we assume that local
policy makers act cooperatively, i. e. they take into account the effects of their policy
on domestic and foreign welfare. We will derive the optimal cooperative carbon taxation
strategy, but the same could be done with the either permit instrument (eˆi1 or eˇi1).
The local policy makers’ problem under cooperation is analogous to that under non-
cooperative carbon taxation policy, which is given by (15). Yet, the cooperatively acting
policy maker maximizes sum of all countries’ welfare levels. We therefore obtain the
maximization problem
max
τi1,τi2
n∑
k=1
Wk =
n∑
k=1
U
(
ck1(τi1, τi2), ck2(τi1, τi2)
)− nD (es1(τi1, τi2)) . (55)
Due to the symmetry of countries we again consider a symmetric policy choice, yielding
identical marginal utility across countries Uit = Ujt = Ut. The first-order condition for
country i’s policy maker regarding the tax rate τ in period t = 1, 2 thus reads
n∑
k=1
∂Wk
∂τit
= U1
n∑
k=1
∂ck1
∂τit
+ U2
n∑
k=1
∂ck2
∂τit
− nD′ ∂es1
∂τit
= 0 for t = 1, 2. (56)
14Set α = 0 in (51) and compare to (41).
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The notion of cooperatively chosen domestic policies as well as symmetric policy and
market equilibria allows us to employ the comparative statics derived for carbon taxes in
Section 2 and Appendix A. For the sum of changes in consumption we obtain
n∑
k=1
∂ckz
∂τit
= ∂ciz
∂τit
+ [n− 1] ∂cjz
∂τit
= [τz + pz]
∂esz
∂τit
, for t, z = {1, 2}, (57)
which we derive in detail in Appendix D. We then use (57) in (56) and simplify with the
help of the differentiated resource constraint (4) to obtain
n∑
k=1
∂Wk
∂τit
=
[
U1[τ1 + p1]− U2[τ2 + p2]− nD′
] ∂es1
∂τit
= 0, for t = 1, 2. (58)
Since we have
∂es1
∂τit
= 0, see Appendix A, the term in square brackets gives the solution
to the problem. However, this term is identical for both first-order conditions, which
indicates that we have one degree of freedom. Put differently, the solution is a linear
combination of carbon tax rates in periods 1 and 2. Using the first-order conditions of
the resource extractor (5) and the household (9) to simplify, we obtain
Proposition 4. Suppose each policy maker considers external effects of its local carbon
tax on other countries’ welfare. Then the optimal choice of carbon tax rates is given by
the following linear combination
τ fb1 −
τ fb2
1 + r
= n
D′
U1
> 0. (59)
Proof. See Appendix D. 
Proposition 4 states that the differential of discounted carbon taxes has to equal the
sum of all countries’ marginal environmental damage. Given symmetry, global marginal
welfare is affected only by the impact of the policy instrument on the time path of resource
supply, which in turn determines environmental damage. Moreover, the policy maker in
country i considers the environmental benefits of its policy experienced in other countries.
Therefore, the term on the right-hand side of (59) exhibits the factor n, denoting the
number of countries. Interregional leakage, on the other hand, is internalized through
cooperation and disappears from the optimality condition altogether, since the outflow
of resource demand in country i is exactly offset by the inflow in the remaining countries
j = i. This is owed to the inelastic supply of the resource as well as to symmetry.
We now turn to the welfare comparison of the policy equilibria of the scenarios presented
above, see Propositions 1 - 3. Let us therefore introduce the notion of a “carbon fee”,
denoted by θt, as a placeholder for the carbon tax rate τt, the local permit price φit
or the global permit price ϕt, since each acts as an instrument to price the emission
content of the resource. Next to that, we need an indication of the emission quantities
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associated with specific policy equilibria, and how this relates to each country’s welfare.
While we cannot solve for the emission quantities themselves, we can show that there
exists a strictly monotonic relation between the steepness of the carbon fee trajectories
(henceforth differential of discounted carbon fees) and the respective extraction in period
1. For symmetric allocations, we derive a relation between extraction in period 1 and the
level of welfare.
Lemma 2. Given symmetric policy choices and defining the differential of discounted
carbon fees as Δ(θ1, θ2) := θ1 − θ21+r with θt ∈ [τit, φit, ϕt] the following holds:
1. Δ(θ1, θ2) is a decreasing function in first-period emissions e1 = e
s
1/n and
2. each country’s welfare Wi(θ1, θ2) is a single-peaked function of per country early
emissions e1 = e
s
1/n.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
Lemma 2 serves to compare the policy equilibrium under the cap-and-trade scenario
with linked markets (Proposition 3) to the one under cooperative policy (Proposition 4).
The results are summarized in
Proposition 5. The decentral policy equilibrium in the scenario with cap-and-trade poli-
cies, linked permit markets and full redistribution of permit sale revenues (α = 1) yields
the same carbon fee differentials and welfare levels as the first-best policy choice, i. e.
Δ
(
τ fb1 , τ
fb
2
)
= Δ
(
ϕ∗1|α=1 , ϕ∗2|α=1
)
= n
D′
Uc1
(60)
W
(
τ fb1 , τ
fb
1
)
= W
(
ϕ∗1|α=1 , ϕ∗2|α=1
)
(61)
Proof. Take ϕ∗1|α=1 and ϕ∗2|α=1 from (53) and (54) and compute Δ
(
ϕ∗1|α=1 , ϕ∗2|α=1
)
.
Together with Proposition 4 this gives (60). Then by Lemma 2 and (60) we obtain
(61). 
Proposition 5 states that equilibrium cap-and-trade policy with linked markets and full
international redistribution of permit revenues is efficient. To see why this is the case,
we take a look at the externalities country i inflicts on other countries j = i. Taking the
derivative of Wj with respect to eˇi1 gives
15
∂Wj
∂eˇi1
=
1
n
U1ϕ1(eˇ
∗
1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
REij(+)
−D′︸︷︷︸
EEij(−)
= 0. (62)
15To obtain (62) we set α = 1 in (158) in Appendix E.
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In (62), the term denoted by REij refers to the redistribution externality and captures
the effect of a change of eˇi1 on the share of global permit revenues transferred to country
j. Given that country i loosens its cap, country j experiences a positive effect through
increasing transfers from central auctioning revenues. At the same time, the loosing of eˇi1
lets environmental damage in country j increase (EEij – environmental externality). An
evaluation of (62) at the policy equilibrium shows that external effects exactly offset each
other.16 Therefore, the policy equilibrium in the scenario of cap-and-trade with linked
markets and auctioning yields an efficient outcome.
Now we turn to the remaining policy scenarios and the respective equilibria. With
the help of Lemma 2 we can rank these with regard to the steepness of their associated
emission paths. The results are contained in
Proposition 6. The differentials of discounted carbon fees of the policy equilibria in
carbon taxes (τ ∗), local (φ∗) and linked permit markets (ϕ∗) relate to each other as follows:
Δ(τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) < Δ(φ
∗
1, φ
∗
2) = Δ
(
ϕ∗1|α=0 , ϕ∗2|α=0
)
< Δ
(
ϕ∗1|α=1 , ϕ∗2|α=1
)
, (63)
where Δ(τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) = T
D′
Uc1
with 0 < T < 1, Δ(φ∗1, φ
∗
2) = Δ
(
ϕ∗1|α=0 , ϕ∗2|α=0
)
= D
′
Uc1
and
Δ
(
ϕ∗1|α=1 , ϕ∗2|α=1
)
= n D
′
Uc1
. The relations of associated first-period emissions are
es1(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) > e
s
1 (φ
∗
1, φ
∗
2) = e
s
1
(
ϕ∗1|α=1 , ϕ∗2|α=1
)
> es1
(
ϕ∗1|α=1 , ϕ∗2|α=1
)
. (64)
Proof. See Lemma 2 and Appendix D. 
Proposition 6 states that the differential of discounted carbon fees is lowest under
carbon taxation. It is second highest under cap-and-trade policy either with local markets
or with linked markets and free allocation. Based on the statement of Proposition 5
the differentials of discounted carbon fees of these three scenarios are suboptimally low.
Consequently this is reflected in the comparison of equilibrium welfare levels of across
scenarios.
Proposition 7. The cap-and-trade policy equilibrium with auctioning and redistribution
(α = 1) yields the highest welfare level due to efficiency. The policy equilibrium in the
scenarios of cap-and-trade policy with local permit markets and with linked markets and
free allocation (α = 0) yield identical suboptimal welfare levels. The policy equilibrium
in the scenario of carbon taxation yields the lowest welfare level compared to all other
scenarios.
W
(
ϕ∗1|α=1 , ϕ∗2|α=1
)
> W
(
ϕ∗1|α=0 , ϕ∗2|α=0
)
= W (φ∗1, φ
∗
2) > W (τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) . (65)
Proof. See Propositions 4 and 6 as well as Lemma 2. 
16Using (53) in (62) gives
∂Wj
∂eˇi1
= 0.
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This proposition concludes our normative analysis. The finding that welfare is highest
in the equilibrium of cap-and-trade policy with linked permit markets and full actioning
directly follows from Proposition 5. Second highest welfare is found in the remaining cap-
and-trade scenarios (linked permit markets with free allocation and local permit markets).
In both cases policy equilibria yield the same level of welfare since the differentials of their
discounted carbon fees are equal and they thus yield the same extraction path. Another
way to explain equal welfare levels, but also inefficiency, is to look at prevailing policy
externalities. In Appendix E we derive for both scenarios the external effect of country i’s
permit supply on another country j’s welfare. The net external effects in both scenarios,
which read17
∂Wj
∂eˆi1
=
∂Wj
∂eˇi1
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= −D′ · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
EEij(−)
< 0. (66)
Equation (66) reveals that it is the environmental externality causing this effect (EEij).
If country i chooses a marginally stricter policy (deˆi1 or deˇi1 < 0), it inflicts a positive
externality on country j through the reduction of environmental damage. The presence
of this externality leads to an inefficient equilibrium.
It is also revealing to take a look at the presence of externalities in the carbon taxation
scenario, which ranks lowest in equilibrium welfare. In Appendix E we derive the following
expressions for the external effects of country i’s tax policy on country j’s welfare level
∂Wj
∂τi1
= U1τ
∗
1
∂ej1
∂τi1
+ U2τ
∗
2
∂ej2
∂τi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
LEij(+)
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂τit︸ ︷︷ ︸
EEij(+)
> 0, (67)
∂Wj
∂τi2
= U1τ
∗
1
∂ej1
∂τi2
+ U2τ
∗
2
∂ej2
∂τi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
LEij(−)
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂τit︸ ︷︷ ︸
EEij(−)
< 0. (68)
These reveal that carbon taxation induces two types of externalities: the leakage exter-
nality (LEij) and the environmental externality (EEij). To read (68) correctly recall that
dτi2 < 0 represent a “tightening” of carbon taxation (increasing the discounted carbon
fee differential). So, tightening carbon taxation either in period 1 or 2 in country i inflicts
positive externalities on country j at the policy equilibrium. The leakage externality is
positive since the relocation of resource use increases net output across the two periods.
The environmental externality follows the same logic as in the other policy scenarios. In
the end, the fact that the leakage externality adds to the environmental externality, which
is present in all scenarios, gives an intuition why carbon taxation yields lower efficiency
than all analyzed cases of cap-and-trade policies.
17See (153) as well as (158) with α = 0 in Appendix E.
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6 Conclusion
We derived non-cooperative equilibria of symmetric, climate policy setting jurisdictions
and established a welfare ranking of different policy regimes. We have shown that cap-
and-trade schemes are superior to carbon taxation, due to their greater effectiveness
in limiting emissions. This is due to the fact that in a setting of binding cap levels
throughout the world, carbon leakage can be ruled out. Furthermore, efficient emission
allocation can be implemented through decentral decision making, if all jurisdictions’
permit markets are linked and auctioning revenues are distributed evenly. This result
is mainly driven by the effect that the environmental externality is exactly offset by a
redistribution externality, which induces each country to choose a lower permission level,
since part of the loss in revenues is experienced by other countries.
The development of the recent years, where cap-and-trade policies have been put into
practice in an increasing number of world regions,18 could – if it were to continue –
contribute to lower leakage considerably as opposed to the spreading of price instrument
regimes. Our model indicates that this could feed back into more stringent policy choices.
With respect to linking of permit markets a real world example can be found in the
first phase 2005-2007 of EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS), where national permit
levels were determined decentrally. Besides having a single permit market, EU member
states decided individually on the level of their national permit levels. In this first phase
however, most permits were freely allocated and cap levels where not enforced strictly,
see Ellerman et al. (2016).
While the EU ETS determines the cap level centrally since the start of phase 2 in 2008
and the share of auctioned permits increases continuously; for other potential linking
initiatives such as between the EU, China, Korea, or California central decision making
on cap levels remains much further down along the road. So, our analysis suggests to
push for (at least some) centralized permit auctioning, especially if countries are very
similar. So the framework of decentrally determined permit levels with a single permit
market could remain relevant.
There are some caveats to our analysis. We assume that the total given stock of
a single homogeneous resource is exhausted. However, climate research shows that it
is certainly not worthwhile to extract and burn all fossil fuels, see Stern (2007). So
we refer to a classic, rather scarce type of fossil fuel, say crude oil, and abstract from
interaction with other types of fuel, including renewables. Our case can be understood
as an extreme one, to show the effects owing to scarcity and speed of extraction. And
last but not least we don’t explore the incentive to implement the redistribution system.
Countries could anticipate the externality and not agree to such a system in the first
place. Other limitations are the homogeneity among actors and jurisdictions, and the
absence of production factors other than fuels.
18See Schmalensee and Stavins (2017).
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A Carbon Taxation
Comparative Statics
In order to derive the comparative static effects of marginal changes in local carbon taxes
τi1 or τi2, the market equilibrium conditions, as stated above, in the text are differentiated
totally and subsequently the symmetry assumption is applied. Beginning (10) - (12) we
obtain
n∑
k=1
dckt = F
′
t
n∑
k=1
dekt, (69)
n∑
k=1
dbk = 0, (70)
n∑
k=1
dekt = de
s
t . (71)
Differentiation of (2) for t = 1, 2, (4) and (5) yields
p1 dr + [1 + r] dp1 = dp2, (72)
des1 = − des2, (73)
F ′′1 dei1 = dp1 + dτi1, (74)
F ′′2 dei2 = dp2 + dτi2, (75)
where dτi1 = 0, dτi2 = 0 when solving for comparative static effects of τi1 (or dτi1 =
0, dτi2 = 0 for comparative static effects of τi2) and dτj1 = dτj2 = 0 for j = i.
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Next, we turn to (7) and (8) where we use (1), (3) and Tit = τiteit for t = 1, 2.
Subsequently, we totally differentiate and simplify by using (2), which gives
dci1 = [F
′
1 − p1 − τ1] dei1 − [dp1 + dτi1]e1 +
es1 dp1 + p1 de
s
1
n
+ e1 dτi1 + τ1 de1 + dbi,
dci1 = τ1 dei1 +
p1
n
des1 + dbi, (76)
dci2 = [F
′
2 − p2 − τ2] dei2 − [dp2 + dτi2]e2 +
es2 dp2 + p2 de
s
2
n
+ e2 dτi2 + τ2 dei2 − b dr − [1 + r] dbi,
dci2 = τ2 dei2 +
p2
n
des2 − [1 + r] dbi, (77)
Totally differentiating the household’s the first-order condition (9) yields
dr = U1 dci1 + U2 dci2 (78)
with Us =
∂
⎡
⎣U1
U2
⎤
⎦
∂cs
=
U1sU2 − Us2U1
[U2]
2 ; s = 1, 2,
where U1 < 0; U2 > 0, which follows from the assumption that ci1 and ci2 are normal
goods. Equations (70) -(78) give the system of differentiated equilibrium conditions.
We proceed by summing up (74), (75) and (78) over all countries and use (69), (71)
and (73) to obtain
n dp1 = − dτi1 +
n∑
k=1
F ′′1 dek1 = − dτi1 + F ′′1 des1, (79)
n dp2 = − dτi2 +
n∑
k=1
F ′′2 dek2 = − dτi2 − F ′′2 des1, (80)
n dr =
n∑
k=1
[U1 dck1 + U2 dck2] = F de
s
1, (81)
where F = U1F
′
1 − U2F ′2. Then, we plug these into (72) and solve for des1 to receive
np1F de
s
1 + [1 + r]n
[− dτi1 + F ′′1 des1] = n[− dτi2 − F ′′2 des1]
⇔ des1 =
[1 + r] dτi1
G
− dτi2
G
, (82)
where G = Fp1 + F
′′
1 [1 + r] + F
′′
2 , which we insert back into (79), (80) and (81) to obtain
⇒ dp1 =
− [Fp1 + F ′′1 [1 + r] + F ′′2 ] dτi1 + [1 + r]F ′′1 dτi1 − F ′′1 dτi2
nG
= − [Fp1 + F
′′
2 ] dτi1
nG
− F
′′
1 dτi2
nG
, (83)
⇒ dp2 =
− [Fp1 + F ′′1 [1 + r] + F ′′2 ] dτi2 − [1 + r]F ′′2 dτi1 + F ′′2 dτi2
nG
= − [1 + r]F
′′
2 dτi1
nG
−
[
Fp1 + [1 + r]F
′′
1
]
dτi2
nG
, (84)
⇒ dr = [1 + r]F dτi1
nG
− F dτi2
nG
. (85)
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Then we consider countries i and j = i and insert (83) into (74) and (84) into (75) to get
⇒ dei1 = dp1 + dτi1
F ′′1
=
dτi1 − [Fp1+F
′′
2 ] dτi1
nG
− F ′′1 dτi2
nG
F ′′1
=
[
nG− [Fp1 + F ′′2 ]
]
dτi1
nF ′′1G
− dτi2
nG
, (86)
⇒ dej1 = dp1
F ′′1
=
− [Fp1+F
′′
2 ] dτi1
nG
− F ′′1 dτi2
nG
F ′′1
= − [Fp1 + F
′′
2 ] dτi1
nF ′′1G
− dτi2
nG
, (87)
⇒ dei2 = dp2 + dτi2
F ′′2
=
dτi2 − [1+r]F
′′
2 dτi1
nG
− [Fp1+[1+r]F
′′
1 ] dτi2
nG
F ′′2
= − [1 + r] dτi1
nG
+
[
nG− [Fp1 + [1 + r]F ′′1 ]] dτi2
nF ′′2G
, (88)
⇒ dej2 = dp2
F ′′2
=
− [1+r]F ′′2 dτi1
nG
− [Fp1+[1+r]F
′′
1 ] dτi2
nG
F ′′2
= − [1 + r] dτi1
nG
−
[
Fp1 + [1 + r]F
′′
1
]
dτi2
nF ′′2G
. (89)
Finally, we take (83) - (89) to compute the comparative static effects of changing τi1 (τi2)
setting dτi2 = 0 (dτi1 = 0). Thereby, we get
∂r
∂τi1
=
[1 + r]F
nG
> 0,
∂r
∂τi2
=
−F
nG
< 0, (90)
∂p1
∂τi1
=
−F ′′2 − Fp1
nG
< 0,
∂p1
∂τi2
=
−F ′′1
nG
< 0, (91)
∂p2
∂τi1
=
−[1 + r]F ′′2
nG
< 0,
∂p2
∂τi2
=
−[1 + r]F ′′1 − p1F
nG
< 0, (92)
∂ei1
∂τi1
=
nG− [F ′′2 + Fp1]
nF ′′1G
< 0,
∂ei1
∂τi2
= − 1
nG
> 0, (93)
∂ei2
∂τi1
= −1 + r
nG
> 0,
∂ei2
∂τi2
=
nG− [[1 + r]F ′′1 + Fp1]
nF ′′2G
< 0, (94)
∂es1
∂τi1
=
1 + r
G
< 0,
∂es1
∂τi2
= − 1
G
> 0, (95)
∂ej1
∂τi1
=
−F ′′2 − Fp1
nF ′′1G
> 0,
∂ej1
∂τi2
= − 1
nG
> 0, (96)
∂ej2
∂τi1
= −1 + r
nG
> 0,
∂ej2
∂τi2
=
−[1 + r]F ′′1 − Fp1
nF ′′2G
> 0, (97)
where F = U1F
′
1 − U2F ′2 < 0 and G = Fp1 + F ′′1 [1 + r] + F ′′2 < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Take the solution to problem (16) stated in Proposition 1, here slightly adapted
τ ∗1 =
D′
U1
· N1
D
, τ ∗2 =
D′
U2
· N2
D
,
with N1 :=
∂es1
∂τi1
∂ei2
∂τi2
− ∂es1
∂τi2
∂ei2
∂τi1
, N2 :=
∂es1
∂τi2
∂ei1
∂τi1
− ∂es1
∂τi1
∂ei1
∂τi2
D := ∂ei1
∂τi1
∂ei2
∂τi2
− ∂ei2
∂τi1
∂ei1
∂τi2
.
Due to the assumptions regarding U(·) and D(·) we have D′
Ut
> 0 for t = 1, 2. Turning to
the the terms N1
D
and N1
D
, we obtain for denominator
D = ∂ei1
∂τi1
∂ei2
∂τi2
− ∂ei2
∂τi1
∂ei1
∂τi2
=
nG− [F ′′2 + Fp1]
nF ′′1G
· nG−
[
[1 + r]F ′′1 + Fp1
]
nF ′′2G
− −[1 + r]
nG
· −1
nG
D =
[n− 1][nG− Fp1]
n2F ′′1 F
′′
2G
> 0, (98)
where nG − Fp1 = [n − 1]Fp1 + n[F ′′1 [1 + r] + F ′′2 ] < 0 with F < 0 (see above in this
Appendix). The sign of numerator N1 is
N1 =
[1 + r]
G
· nG− [F
′′
1 [1 + r] + Fp1]
nF ′′2G
− 1 + r
nG
· 1
G
,
N1 =
[n− 1][1 + r]
nF ′′2G
> 0, (99)
where G < 0 (see above in this Appendix), and that of N2 is
N2 =
−1
G
· nG− 1[F
′′
2 + Fp1]
nF ′′1G
− 1 + r
G
· −1
nG
,
N2 =
1− n
nF ′′1G
< 0. (100)
Given (98), (99) and (100) it follows that
τ ∗1 > 0, (101)
τ ∗2 < 0, (102)
as well as that
0 <
N1
D
=
nF ′′1 [1 + r]
nG− Fp1 < 1, (103)
0 <− N2
D
=
nF ′′2
nG− Fp1 < 1, (104)
recalling that G = Fp1 + F
′′
1 [1 + r] + F
′′
2 . This proves Proposition 1.
B Cap Policy Equilibrium with Local Permit Markets
Incentive for country i to introduce a cap in period 2 In order to derive (30) and
(31) we take (21) and (22) and plug in πit and π
R
t from (3), (19) and apply ei1 = eˆi1.
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We then differentiate with respect to eˆi2 and simplify by (20) for t = 1, (24), (28) and
(29) as well as by the symmetry assumption, i. e. symmetric policy choice in period 1
(eˆi1 = eˆj1 =
es1
n
), a symmetric market equilibrium, i.e. ei2 = ej2 =
es2
n
, bi = bj = 0 and a
marginally binding cap in country i (eˆi2 = ei2), which gives
∂ci1
∂eˆi2
=
[
F ′1 − p1 − φi1
] ∂eˆi1
∂eˆi2︸︷︷︸
=0
−
[
∂p1
∂eˆi2
+
∂φi1
∂eˆi2
]
eˆi1 + eˆi1
∂φi1
∂eˆi2
+
1
n
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣p1 ∂e
s
1
∂eˆi2︸︷︷︸
=0
+es1
∂p1
∂eˆi2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦+ ∂bi∂eˆi2
=
∂bi
∂eˆi2
, (105)
∂ci2
∂eˆi2
= F ′2 − p2 − φi2 −
[
∂p2
∂eˆi2
+
∂φi2
∂eˆi2
]
eˆi2 + φi2 + eˆi2
∂φi2
∂eˆi2
+
1
n
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣p2 ∂e
s
2
∂eˆi2︸︷︷︸
=0
+es1
∂p2
∂eˆi2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi2
− bi︸︷︷︸
=0
∂r
∂eˆi2
= φi2 − [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi2
. (106)
To derive (32) we differentiate (23) and simplify by use of (9), (28), (30), (31) with φi2 = 0
and obtain
∂Wi
∂eˆi2
= U1
∂ci1
∂eˆi2
+ U2
∂ci2
∂eˆi2
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂eˆi2
= U1
[
∂bi
∂eˆi2
]
+ U2
⎡
⎣ φi2︸︷︷︸
=0
−[1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi2
⎤
⎦ = 0. (107)
Incentive for country i to introduce a cap in period 1 We differentiate (21) and (22)
with respect to eˆi1, with ei1 = eˆi1 and φi2 = 0. After differentiating we apply φi1 = 0
since symmetric caps set in period 1 are marginally binding. To simplify we use (35)
and (36) and apply the symmetry assumption, i. e. a symmetric policy choice in period
1 (eˆi1 = eˆj1 =
es1
n
), a symmetric market equilibrium, i. e. ei2 = ej2 =
es2
n
, bi = bj = 0).
∂ci1
∂eˆi1
= F ′1 − p1 − φi1 −
[
∂p1
∂eˆi1
+
∂φi1
∂eˆi1
]
eˆi1 + φi1 +
∂φi1
∂eˆi1
eˆi1 +
1
n
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣p1 ∂e
s
1
∂eˆi1︸︷︷︸
=1
+es1
∂p1
∂eˆi1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦+ ∂bi∂eˆi1 ,
∂ci1
∂eˆi1
= φi1 +
p1
n
+
∂bi
∂eˆi1
, (108)
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∂ci2
∂eˆi1
=
[
F ′2 − p2
] · ∂ei2
∂eˆi1
− ei2 ∂p2
∂eˆi1
+
1
n
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣p2 ∂e
s
2
∂eˆi1︸︷︷︸
=−1
+es2
∂p2
∂eˆi2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦− [1 + r] ∂bi∂eˆi1 − bi ∂r∂eˆi1 ,
∂ci2
∂eˆi1
= −p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi1
. (109)
To derive (39), we differentiate (23) with respect to eˆi1 and plug in (35), (37) and (38).
Then we use (5) and (9) to simplify and obtain
∂Wi
∂eˆi1
= U1
∂ci1
∂eˆi1
+ U2
∂ci2
∂eˆi1
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂eˆi1︸︷︷︸
=1
= U1
[
p1
n
+
∂bi
∂eˆi1
]
+ U2
[
−p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi1
]
−D′
= U2
[
[1 + r]p1
n
+ [1 + r]
∂bi
∂eˆi2
− p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi2
]
−D′ = −D′ < 0. (110)
Optimal decentral choice of caps in period 1 Assuming a symmetric policy choice
eˆi1 = eˆ1, we have φi1 = φj1 = φ1 ≥ 0 due to (20) and a firm choice satisfying ei1 = eˆ1.
Then, deriving the first-order condition of (40) and subsequently using (35), (108) and
(109) and simplifying with the help of (5) and (9) yields
∂Wi
∂eˆi1
= U1
∂ci1
∂eˆi1
+ U2
∂ci2
∂eˆi1
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂eˆi1
= 0
= U1
[
φ1 +
p1
n
+
∂bi
∂eˆi1
]
+ U2
[
−p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi1
]
−D′ = 0
= U1φ1 + U2
[
[1 + r]
p1
n
+ [1 + r]
∂bi
∂eˆi1
− p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi1
]
−D′ = 0
= U1φ1 −D′ = 0. (111)
C Cap Policy with Linked Permit Markets
Tightening eˇi2 beyond the marginally binding level Suppose that all countries i, j
impose symmetric, marginally binding caps eˇit = eˇij = eˇt in periods 1 and 2, i. e. eˇit =
eLFkt , where e
LF
kt denotes resource demand in country i and period t in the absence of
policy. The market equilibrium is described by (4), (5), (9), (11), (12), (45) and (46),
which serves as the point of departure for determining the comparative static effects of
eˇi2 (deˇi2 = 0 and deˇi1 = deˇj1 = deˇj2 = 0). First, we use (11) in (46) for period 1 to
substitute for
∑n
k=1 ek1. Then we differentiate and obtain
∂es1
∂eˇi2
= 0, (112)
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which we use after differentiating (4) with respect to eˇi2 to receive
∂es2
∂eˇi2
= 0. (113)
Then we differentiate (7) and (8), where πit is given by (44), Tit =
α
n
ϕt
∑n
k=1 eˇkt, and
πR1 and π
R
2 are given by (3) and simplify by use of (45), (112) and (113) as well as the
symmetry assumption, i. e. eˇit = eˇjt = ei2 = ej2 =
est
n
, bi = bj = 0, F (eit)
′ = F ′t which is
due to (45) as well as the symmetric policy choice, which gives
∂ci1
∂eˇi2
=
[
F ′1 − p1 − ϕ1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
∂ei1
∂eˇi2
−
[
∂p1
∂eˇi2
+
∂ϕ1
∂eˇi2
]
ei1 + [1− α]eˇi1 ∂ϕ1
∂eˇi2
+
α
n
∂ϕ1
∂eˇi2
n∑
k=1
eˇk1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∂ϕ1
∂eˇi2
eˇi1
+
1
n
[
p1
∂es1
∂eˇi2︸︷︷︸
=0
+es1
∂p1
∂eˇi2
]
+
∂bi
∂eˇi2
∂ci1
∂eˇi2
=
∂bi
∂eˇi2
, (114)
∂ci2
∂eˇi2
=
[
F ′2 − p2 − ϕ2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
∂ei2
∂eˇi2
−
[
∂p2
∂eˇi2
+
∂ϕ2
∂eˇi2
]
ei2 + [1− α]eˇi1 ∂ϕ2
∂eˇi2
+
α
n
∂ϕ2
∂eˇi2
n∑
k=1
eˇk2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∂ϕ2
∂eˇi2
eˇi2
+ [1− α]ϕ2 + α
n
ϕ2 +
1
n
[
p2
∂es2
∂eˇi2︸︷︷︸
=0
+es1
∂p2
∂eˇi2
]
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˇi2
− bi︸︷︷︸
=0
∂r
∂eˇi2
∂ci2
∂eˇi2
=
[
1− α + α
n
]
ϕ2 − [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˇi2
. (115)
As in Section 3, we formulate welfare as a function of the caps in both periods
Wi = U
(
ci1 (eˇi1, eˇi2) , ci2 (eˇi1, eˇi2)
)−D (es1 (eˇi1, eˇi2)) . (116)
Differentiating (116) with respect to eˇi2 we use (112), (114), (115) with ϕ1 = ϕ2 = 0,
since we assume that the point of departure exhibits marginally binding caps in periods
1 and 2, and simplify with the help of (9) to obtain
∂Wi
∂eˇi2
= U1
∂ci1
∂eˇi2
+ U2
∂ci2
∂eˇi2
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂eˇi2
= U1
[
∂bi
∂eˇi2
]
+ U2
[
−[1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˇi2
]
= U2
[
[1 + r]
∂bi
∂eˇi2
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˇi2
]
= 0. (117)
Equation (117) states that the net effect of tightening the cap in country i in period 2
departing from a policy choice of marginally binding caps in both peridos has no effect
on domestic welfare.
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Tightening eˇi1 beyond the marginally binding level Based on the finding above, i. e.
there is no incentive to tighten the second period cap eˇi2 beyond the marginally binding
level, suppose that all countries i, j impose symmetric, marginally binding caps eˇit =
eˇij = eˇt only in period 1. The market equilibrium is described by (4), (5), (9), (11), (12),
and for t = 1 (45) and (46), while for t = 2 we adapt (45) to obtain
F ′(ek2) = p2. (118)
This market equilibrium serves as the point of departure for determining the comparative
static effects of eˇi1 (deˇi1 = 0 and deˇj1 = 0). First, we use (11) in (46) for period 1 to
substitute for
∑n
k=1 ek1. Then we differentiate and obtain
∂es1
∂eˇi1
= 1, (119)
which we use after differentiating (4) with respect to eˇi1 to receive
∂es2
∂eˇi1
= −1. (120)
Then we differentiate (7) and (8), where πi1 is given by (44) and for πi2 we take (44) with
ϕ2 = 0, Ti1 =
α
n
ϕ1
∑n
k=1 eˇk1 and Ti2 = 0, and π
R
1 and π
R
2 are given by (3). To simplify, we
make use of (45) for t = 1, (118), (119) and (120) as well as the symmetry assumption,
as outlined above in this Appendix, which gives for period 1
∂ci1
∂eˇi1
=
[
F ′1 − p1 − ϕ1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
∂ei1
∂eˇi1
−
[
∂p1
∂eˇi1
+
∂ϕ1
∂eˇi1
]
ei1 + [1− α]eˇi1 ∂ϕ1
∂eˇi1
+
α
n
∂ϕ1
∂eˇi1
n∑
k=1
eˇk1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∂ϕ1
∂eˇi1
eˇi1
+ [1− α]ϕ1 + α
n
ϕ1 +
1
n
[
p1
∂es1
∂eˇi1︸︷︷︸
=1
+es1
∂p1
∂eˇi1
]
+
∂bi
∂eˇi1
∂ci1
∂eˇi1
=
[
1− α + α
n
]
ϕ1 +
p1
n
+
∂bi
∂eˇi1
, (121)
and for period 2
∂ci2
∂eˇi1
=
[
F ′2 − p2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
∂ei2
∂eˇi1
− ∂p2
∂eˇi1
ei2 +
1
n
[
p2
∂es2
∂eˇi1︸︷︷︸
=−1
+es1
∂p2
∂eˇi1
]
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˇi1
− bi︸︷︷︸
=0
∂r
∂eˇi1
∂ci2
∂eˇi1
= −p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˇi1
. (122)
Since countries are assumed to conduct cap-and-trade policy only in period 1, we adapt
(116) from above accordingly, which then reads
Wi = U
(
ci1 (eˇi1) , ci2 (eˇi1)
)−D (es1 (eˇi1)) . (123)
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Then differentiating (123) with respect to eˇi1, plugging in (121) with ϕ1 = 0 (just
marginally binding caps), (122) as well as (119) and simplifying by use of (5) and (9)
gives
∂Wi
∂eˇi1
= U1
∂ci1
∂eˇi1
+ U2
∂ci2
∂eˇi1
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂eˇi1
= U1
[
p1
n
+
∂bi
∂eˇi1
]
+ U2
[
−p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˇi1
]
−D′
= U2
[
[1 + r]
p1
n
+ [1 + r]
∂bi
∂eˇi1
− p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˇi1
]
−D′ = −D′ < 0. (124)
Equation (124) shows that, when all countries implement cap-and-trade policies with
a common permit market, and there is no such policy in period 2, country i has the
incentive to tighten its cap unilaterally beyond the marginally binding level.
Policy choice Based on the assessment of the incentive to tighten caps beyond the
marginal levels, suppose that all countries implement binding caps in period 1 and that
there is no cap-and-trade policy in period 2. Thus, the market equilibrium is given by
(4), (5), (9), (11), (12), and for t = 1 (45) and (46), while for t = 2 (118). Therefore,
the comparative static effects given by (119), (121) and (122) from above carry over,
which we use in the first-order condition of the policy problem given by (50). Recall,
that ϕ1 ≥ 0, since we account for the case of strictly binding caps. We use (5) as well as
(9) to simplify and obtain
∂Wi
∂eˇi1
= U1
∂ci1
∂eˇi1
+ U2
∂ci2
∂eˇi1
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂eˇi1
= 0
= U1
[[
1− α + α
n
]
ϕ1 +
p1
n
+
∂bi
∂eˇi1
]
+ U2
[
−p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˇi1
]
−D′
=
[
1− α + α
n
]
U1ϕ1 −D′ = 0. (125)
D Welfare Analysis
Cooperative Policy
The differentiated budget constraints of the household in country i (7) and (8) are given
by (76) and (77) in Appendix A, which we divide by dτi1 to obtain
∂ci1
∂τi1
= τ1
∂ei1
∂τi1
+
∂es1
∂τi1
p1
n
+
∂bi
∂τi1
, (126)
∂ci2
∂τi1
= τ2
∂ei2
∂τi1
+
∂es2
∂τi1
p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂τi1
. (127)
Deriving the differentials of the household budget constraints in country j = i follows
the same procedure as applied for the derivation of (76) and (77), where dτi1 = 0 and
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dτj1 = 0, and yields the same results. So, dividing (76) and (77) for the case of country
j by dτi1 = 0 gives
∂cj1
∂τi1
= τ1
∂ej1
∂τi1
+
∂es1
∂τi1
p1
n
+
∂bj
∂τi1
, (128)
∂cj2
∂τi1
= τ2
∂ej2
∂τi1
+
∂es2
∂τi1
p2
n
− [1 + r] dbj
∂τi1
. (129)
Next, we use (126) - (129) to compute
∂ci1
∂τi1
+ [n− 1]∂cj1
∂τi1
= τ1
[
∂ei1
∂τi1
+ [n− 1]∂ej1
∂τi1
]
+
∂es1
∂τi1
p1 +
∂bi
∂τi1
+ [n− 1] ∂bj
∂τi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
∂ci1
∂τi1
+ [n− 1]∂cj1
∂τi1
= [τ1 + p1]
∂es1
∂τi1
, (130)
∂ci2
∂τi1
+ [n− 1]∂cj2
∂τi1
= τ2
[
∂ei2
∂τi1
+ [n− 1]∂ej2
∂τi1
]
+
∂es2
∂τi1
p1 − [1 + r] ∂bi
∂τi1
+ [n− 1][1 + r] ∂bj
∂τi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
∂ci2
∂τi1
+ [n− 1]∂cj2
∂τi1
= [τ2 + p2]
∂es2
∂τi1
, (131)
where (12) and (11) were used to simplify. Next, we apply the same procedure to derive
the comparative static effects of τi2 on the sum of the budget constraints and obtain
∂ci1
∂τi2
+ [n− 1]∂cj1
∂τi2
= [τ1 + p1]
∂es1
∂τi1
, (132)
∂ci2
∂τi2
+ [n− 1]∂cj2
∂τi2
= [τ2 + p2]
∂es2
∂τi2
. (133)
Proof of Lemma 2
Part 1: The relation of carbon fee differentials to emissions We first take the
discounted carbon fee differential and use the local production firm’s first-order conditions
in period 1 and 2 to replace θt. Since in the case of taxes a carbon fee applies in each
period, we take (2) and replace τt by θt. Then we use (5) and (9) to simplify and use the
notion of symmetry et =
est
n
in combination with the resource constraint (4) which gives
e2 = e¯/n− e1. Finally we replace ct in the Ut(c1, c2) taking the budget constraint of the
household at the symmetric allocation (bi = 0), which gives ct = F (et) − (pt + θt)et +
θtet +
ptest
n
= F (et). The result is
Δ (θ1, θ2) = θ1 − θ2
1 + r
= F ′ (e1)− p1 − F
′ (e2)− p2
1 + r
= F ′ (e1)− F
′ (e2)
1 + r
= F ′ (e1)− F ′
(
e¯/n− e1
) U2 (F (e1) , F (e¯/n− e1))
U1
(
F (e1) , F
(
e¯/n− e1
)) := Δ˜(e1). (134)
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For convenience, we denote the first and second derivatives of the production function by
F ′(et) = F ′t and F
′′(et) = F ′′t below. To show monotonicity we derive with respect to e1
and obtain
dΔ˜ (e1)
de1
= F ′′1 + F
′′
2
U2
U1
− F ′2
[F ′1U21 − F ′2U22]U1 − [F ′1U11 − F ′2U12]U2
U21
= F ′′1 + F
′′
2
U2
U1
− F ′2
F ′1
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
[U21U1 − U11U2] +F ′2
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
[U12U2 − U22U1]
U21
< 0. (135)
This proves part 1 of Lemma 2. Note that the terms in the denominator of the second
fraction in (135) are positive since c1 and c2 are normal goods.
Part 2: The relation of welfare to emissions We express welfare as a function of e1,
given a symmetric equilibrium and follow the approach used in (134) to express utility as
a function e1 while in the damage function we set e
s
1 = n·e1 due to symmetry. Considering
ct = F (et)− (pt+θt)et+θtet+ pte
s
t
n
= F (et), as mentioned in the proof of part 1 of Lemma
2, it follows
W (θ1, θ2) = U
(
c1 (e1, e2) , c2 (e1, e2)
)−D (es1)
= U
(
F (e1) , F (e2)
)−D (ne1)
= U
(
F (e1) , F
(
e¯/n− e1
))−D (ne1) =: W˜ (e1). (136)
To show single-peakedness we derive with respect to e1, which gives
dW˜ (e1)
de1
= F ′1U1 − F ′2U2 − nD′, (137)
lim
e1→0
dW˜ (e1)
de1
= F ′1U1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∞·∞
−F ′2U2︸ ︷︷ ︸
f+·f+
− nD′︸︷︷︸
f+·f+0
> 0, lim
e1→e¯/n
dW˜ (e1)
de1
= F ′1U1︸ ︷︷ ︸
f+·f+
−F ′2U2︸ ︷︷ ︸
∞·∞
− nD′︸︷︷︸
f+·f+0
< 0,
(138)
where f+0 (f
+) is a finite and (strictly) positive number. As we consider resource input
as essential in commodity production, marginal output rises to infinity when input goes
to zero. The same holds for consumption and utility.
d2W (e1)
de21
= F ′′1 U1 + F
′
1
[
F ′1U11 − F ′2U12
]
+ F ′′2 U2 − F ′2
[
F ′1U21 − F ′2U22
]− n2D′′
= F ′′1 U1︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+F ′′2 U2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+F ′21 U11︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+F ′22 U22︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− 2F ′1F ′2U12︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−n2D′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0. (139)
This proves that W (e1) is a single-peaked concave function.
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Carbon Fee Differentials of the Policy Equilibria
To derive the carbon fee differentials for the policy equilibrium in each scenario, we take
the respective equilibrium tax rates or permit prices and replace the carbon fees by the
given terms given in Propositions 1 - 3. For the case of carbon taxation we also use (103)
and (104) from Appendix A. We then simplify by the use of (9) and obtain
Δ(τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) = τ
∗
1 −
τ ∗2
1 + r
=
N1
D
D′
U1
− N2
D
D′
U2
1 + r
=
[
nF ′′1 [1 + r]
nG− Fp1 −
−nF ′′2
nG− Fp1
]
D′
U1
=
n
[
F ′′1 [1 + r] + F
′′
2
]
n
[
Fp1 + F ′′1 [1 + r] + F
′′
2
]− Fp1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:T ∈ (0,1)
D′
U1
, (140)
Δ(φ∗1, φ
∗
2) = φ1(eˆ
∗
1)−
0
1 + r
=
D′
U1
, (141)
Δ
(
ϕ∗1|α=0 , ϕ∗2|α=0
)
= ϕ∗1|α=0 −
0
1 + r
=
D′
U1
, (142)
Δ
(
ϕ∗1|α=1 , ϕ∗2|α=1
)
= ϕ∗1|α=1 −
0
1 + r
= n
D′
U1
, (143)
where F = U1F
′
1 − U2F ′2 < 0 with Uv =
∂
[
U1
U2
]
∂v
= U1vU2−Uv2U1
[U2]
2 ; U1 < 0; U2 > 0; v = 1, 2.
E Externalities
Carbon Taxation
The welfare function of country j is identical to that of country i given in (15). For sake
of completeness, we also denote the dependence of the market equilibrium on domestic
tax rates (j) and foreign tax rates (here i = j as a representative foreign country)
Wj = U
(
cj1
(
τj1, τi1, τj2, τi2
)
, cj2
(
τj1, τi1, τj2, τi2
))−D (es1 (τj1, τi1, τj2, τi2)) . (144)
We take the derivative of (144) with respect to τit, which gives
∂Wj
∂τit
= U1
∂cj1
∂τit
+ U2
∂cj2
∂τit
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂τit
for t = [1, 2]. (145)
Equations (76) and (77) carry over to country j. So, we divide these by dτit and use the
resulting expressions for
∂cj1
∂τit
and
∂cj2
∂τit
in (145). Then we simplify by use of (5), (9), and
the symmetry assumption as stated in Section 2 and obtain
∂Wj
∂τit
= U1τj1
∂ej1
∂τit
+ U2τj2
∂ej2
∂τit
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂τit
for t = [1, 2]. (146)
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In order to evaluate (146) at the policy equilibrium, we use (17) and (18) together with
(103) and (104) as well as the relevant expressions from (95) - (97), which gives
∂Wj
∂τi1
= U1τ
∗
1
∂ej1
∂τi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
LE1ij(+)
+U2τ
∗
2
∂ej2
∂τi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
LE2ij(−)
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂τi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
EEij(+)
∂Wj
∂τi1
= D′
[ −Fp1
G[nG− Fp1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
LEij(+)
+
−[1 + r]
G︸ ︷︷ ︸
EEij(+)
]
> 0. (147)
as well as
∂Wj
∂τi2
= U1τ
∗
1
∂ej1
∂τi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
LE1ij(+)
+U2τ
∗
2
∂ej2
∂τi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
LE2ij(−)
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂τi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
EEij(−)
∂Wj
∂τi2
= D′
[
Fp1
G[nG− Fp1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
LEij(−)
+
1
G︸︷︷︸
EEij(−)
]
< 0. (148)
Cap-and-Trade Policy
Local permit markets The change in consumption in country j due to change in eˆi1 is
derived along the lines of Appendix B, see (108) and (109), only that deˆj1 = 0.
∂cj1
∂eˆi1
=
[
F ′1 − p1 − φi1
] ∂eˆj1
∂eˆi1︸︷︷︸
=0
−
[
∂p1
∂eˆi1
+
∂φi1
∂eˆi1
]
eˆj1 +
∂φj1
∂eˆi1
eˆj1 +
1
n
[
p1
∂es1
∂eˆi1︸︷︷︸
=1
+es1
∂p1
∂eˆi1
]
+
∂bi
∂eˆi1
∂cj1
∂eˆi1
=
p1
n
+
∂bi
∂eˆi1
, (149)
∂cj2
∂eˆi1
=
[
F ′2 − p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
]
· ∂ei2
∂eˆi1
− ei2 ∂p2
∂eˆi1
+
1
n
[
p2
∂es2
∂eˆi1︸︷︷︸
=−1
+es2
∂p2
∂eˆi1
]
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi1
− bi︸︷︷︸
=0
∂r
∂eˆi1
∂cj2
∂eˆi1
= −p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bi
∂eˆi1
. (150)
Along the lines of the derivation of external effects of carbon taxation (see above here)
the welfare function of country j depending on domestic caps (j) and foreign caps (here
i = j) writes
Wj = U
(
cj1
(
eˆj1, eˆi1
)
, cj2
(
eˆj1, eˆi1
))−D (es1 (eˆj1, eˆi1)) . (151)
We take the derivative of (151), plug in (149) and (150) and simplify by making use of
(5) and (9) to obtain
∂Wj
∂eˆi1
= U1
∂cj1
∂eˆi1
+ U2
∂cj2
∂eˆi1
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂eˆi1
, (152)
∂Wj
∂eˆi1
= −D′︸︷︷︸
EEij
< 0. (153)
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Linked permit markets As for local permit markets, we begin by deriving ∂cj1
∂eˇi1
and
∂cj2
∂eˇi1
.
We follow the derivation of (121) and (122), where we still have deˇi1 = 0 and deˇj1 = 0
and where Tj1 = ϕ1eˇj1 and Tj2 = 0 and obtain
∂cj1
∂eˇi1
=
α
n
ϕ1 +
p1
n
+
∂bj
∂eˇi1
, (154)
∂cj2
∂eˇi1
= −p2
n
− [1 + r] ∂bj
∂eˇi1
. (155)
Then, adapting (151) to the scenario of linked permit markets gives
Wj = U
(
cj1
(
eˇj1, eˇi1
)
, cj2
(
eˇj1, eˇi1
))−D (es1 (eˇj1, eˇi1)) , (156)
which we derive with respect to eˇi1 to obtain
∂Wj
∂eˇi1
= U1
∂cj1
∂eˇi1
+ U2
∂cj2
∂eˇi1
−D′ ∂e
s
1
∂eˇi1
. (157)
Lastly, we use (154) and (155) in (157) and simplify with the help of (5) and (9) to receive
∂Wj
∂eˇi1
=
α
n
U1ϕ1(eˇ
∗
1)−D′. (158)
38
 
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg
Faculty of Economics and Management
P.O. Box  4120 | 39016 Magdeburg | Germany
Tel.: +49 (0) 3 91 / 67-1 85 84
Fax: +49 (0) 3 91 / 67-1 21 20
www.ww.uni-magdeburg.dew.f w.ovgu. e/femm
ISSN 1615-4274
